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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN MONTANA
Mae Nan Ellingson
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana has joined an ever increasing number of states in
modifying the harsh common law doctrine of contributory negli-
gence.' The 1975 legislature enacted a statute which provides that
contributory negligence will not bar recovery by a person seeking
damages for personal injury, death, or property damage if such neg-
ligence is not greater than the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought.2
The notion behind the doctrine of comparative negligence is to
allow a plaintiff, who may have been negligent, to recover from a
negligent defendant the amount of damages caused by the defen-
dant's conduct, in spite of plaintiff's negligence. The degree to
which the plaintiff can be negligent and still recover a portion of his
damages varies among the various jurisdictions.
The purpose of this article is to summarize the history of com-
parative negligence in this country, to examine Montana's statute
in light of that history, to analyze the mechanics of the Montana
approach, to outline the possible effects of comparative negligence
on the existing tort law, to suggest some directions that the courts
might take in construing the statute, and to indicate the need for
additional legislation to make the statute more workable.
1. By statute: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14
(Supp. 1971); GEN. STAT. OF CONN. § 52-572(h) (1975); GA. CODE ANN. 105-603 (1968); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1972); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
258(a)(b) (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §156 (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 231 § 85 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.91 (Supp. 1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454
(1956); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 9-10-07 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 507.7a (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 et
seq. (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 11 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 18-470 (1971);
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 5141 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1972); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Supp. 1975); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1953) (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1036 (1973); REV. CODES
WASH. ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1973); Wvo. STATS. §
1-7.2 (1967). By judicial decision: California: Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal.3d
804, 532 P.2d 226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Florida: Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.
1973).
2. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 58-607.1.
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury
to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be dimin-
ished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering.
Enacted by Sec. 1, Ch. 60, L. 1975.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The growing acceptance of "so-called" 3 comparative negligence
is grounded on the dissatisfaction of courts and practitioners of tort
litigation with the common law doctrine of contributory negligence.
That doctrine has traditionally barred a plaintiff from recovering
any damages if his actions in any way contribute to his injury. As
Dean William Prosser so aptly stated:
The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon
the obvious injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss caused
by the fault of two parties on one of them alone, and that one the
injured plaintiff, least able to bear it, and quite possibly much less
at fault than the defendant who goes scot free.'
Such a harsh policy, being unjustifiable and at the same time,
firmly embedded in the common law, resulted in judicial and legis-
lative attempts to ameliorate its effect through the doctrines of last
clear chance' and discovered peril. The application of these doc-
trines has become tortured, complex, and inadequate, since they
can be applied in only a few of the personal injury cases where
contributory negligence is an issue. Consequently the severe appli-
cation of contributory negligence has gone largely unabated.
Criticism of the doctrine has increased in recent years,6 how-
ever, and courts have shown some sensitivity to the inequities of the
rule.7 In spite of their sensitivity, the courts of most states have
emphatically declared that it is the legislature's responsibility to rid
the law of the contributory negligence defense.' Nevertheless, the
3. The term "so-called" is used here to indicate that the use of the term comparative
negligence may be a misnomer. Nowhere in the statute is the term comparative negligence
used. Rather, the statute has eliminated contributory negligence as a complete defense and
its place provides for diminution of damages of the person injured when he has been guilty
of negligence that has contributed to his own injury.
4. W. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 469 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Prosser].
5. Davis v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 589 (Ex. 1842). The rule states that a plaintiff
may recover in full for his injuries regardless of his own negligence if the defendant in exercise
of reasonable care could have avoided the injury.
6. See, e.g., Haugh, Comparative Negligence: A Reform Long Overdue, 49 ORE. L. REV.
38, 39-42 (1969); Note, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1,
19-20 (1946-47); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 189, 199
(1950); Prosser, supra note 4 at 469.
7. The most widely known case in which the judiciary promotes the use of comparative
negligence is Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App.2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284, 290 (1967). See, James,
Kalven, Keeton, Leflar, Malone & Wade, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v.
Contributory Negligence: Should the Courts or the Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 889
(1968).
8. See, e.g., Maki v. Frelk, supra note 7 at 290; Haig v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202
Minn. 425, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938); Rossman v. La Grega 28 N.Y.2d 300, 270 N.E. 313, 316-
317, 321 N.Y.S.2d 588, 594-595 (1971).
19761
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Supreme Courts of Florida and California have recently ruled that
the doctrine of comparative negligence is available in those states.'
Notwithstanding these two court decisions, the advent of compara-
tive negligence in this country has been due to the efforts of state
legislatures, 0 with the bulk of this effort occurring in the years since
1969."
In spite of this relatively recent emphasis on comparative negli-
gence, the doctrine is not a new one. The courts of this country have
long apportioned damages and fault in admiralty cases. 2 The courts
did not, however, apportion damages by degree of fault, but rather
divided the damages equally among the negligent parties. 3 Illinois
was the first state to modify contributory negligence in the field of
civil law. In the 1858 case of Galena & Chicago Railroad Co. v.
Jacobs, '" the Illinois supreme court characterized negligence as ei-
ther slight or gross and held that if the plaintiff was slightly negli-
gent and the defendant was grossly negligent in comparison, the
plaintiff could recover. 5 Although currently in use in some states,"
Illinois has found this standard to be unworkable and abandoned it
in 1894.'7
Notwithstanding these early attempts and one successful ef-
fort" at apportioning damages, the real legislative history of com-
parative negligence began in 1908 with the adoption of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act.'" The FELA provides that a suit brought
9. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 435-438 (Fla. 1973); Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of
California, supra note 1. The Supreme Court of Florida in the Hoffman case determined that
it had the power to change a common law doctrine.
10. See statutes, supra note 1.
11. See statutes, supra note 1.
12. Ralston v. The State Rights, 20 F. Cas. 201, 208 (No. 11, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1836).
13. Id. at 208. This is still the rule in admiralty cases in the United States.
14. Galena & Chi. R.R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858).
15. If both defendant and plaintiff were similarly negligent, there could be no recovery.
Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36, 45-47 (1944).
16. Neb. Laws 1913, ch. 124 § 1 at 311 (now NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964)); S.D.
Laws 1941, ch. 160 at 184 (now S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967)). Both Nebraska
and South Dakota have adopted the "slight-gross" approach to comparative negligence. In
both states, as in Illinois, the standard is imprecise, confusing and unworkable. It is not
surprising that this form of comparative negligence has been rejected in favor of the "pure"
or "modified" type.
17. Lake Shore E.M.S. Ry. v. Hession, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N.E. 905, 907 (1894).
18. In 1860 Georgia passed a comparative negligence statute that included apportion-
ment of damages in proportion to fault for injuries suffered in railroad accidents. GA. CODE §
2979 (1860), and § 2914 (1862). This law was subsequently expanded by judicial interpretation
in Berry v. Jowers, 59 Ga. App. 24, 200 S.E. 195 (1938), to include all defendants. There has
been a recent codification of the rule in GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968), which provides that:
If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to himself
caused by defendant's negligence, he is not entitled to recover. In other cases, the
defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have contributed
to the injury sustained.
i9. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (i9-70).
3
Ellingson: Comparative Negligence In Montana
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1976
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
by an employee against a railroad for personal injury or death is not
barred by an employee's contributory negligence, but the damages
recoverable are diminished in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the employee3 ° Many states, including Mon-
tana, have enacted employer's liability acts covering railroad em-
ployees patterned after the FELA.2 ' Montana also enacted a general
Workman's Compensation Act which provides that contributory
negligence of the employee is not a defense in an action brought by
an injured workman against his employer, but the statute does not
provide for the apportionment of damages.
22
The FELA is classified as a pure, as opposed to a modified,
comparative negligence statute.3 The pure and modified forms of
comparative negligence are alike in that the plaintiff's recoverable
damages are diminished in proportion to his degree of fault. Con-
versely, the defendant is liable for the proportion of damages for
which he is to blame. 4 The critical factor that distinguishes pure
comparative negligence from the modified form is the amount of
negligence of which the plaintiff may be guilty and still recover
some damages from a negligent defendant. In a pure jurisdiction,
the plaintiff may be found to be more responsible for this injury
than the defendant, and still recover. For example, if the plaintiff
is adjudged to be 98 percent negligent and the defendant is found
to be 2 percent negligent, the plaintiff can recover 2 percent of his
damages. By contrast, such recovery would not be permitted in any
of the modified jurisdictions. Absent a pure form of comparative
negligence, a plaintiff cannot recover if his negligence exceeds that
of the defendant.
To date, only a small number of states have followed the FELA
and enacted pure comparative negligence statutes. Mississippi was
the first to do so in 1910 and consequently the pure form of compara-
tive negligence has become known as the "Mississippi type."
Puerto Rico followed Mississippi in 193026 and three states have
20. Id.
21. R.C.M. 1947, § 72-649. This statute, which is limited to railroads, was applied in
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wojtala, 112 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1940).
22. R.C.M. 1947, § 92-201. Under this section, the negligence of the employer is not an
essential element of his liability for injuries sustained by an employee during employment,
nor are defenses or contributory negligence and assumption of risk available.
23. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Tilghman, 237 U.S. 499, 501 (1915); Flynn, Comparative
Negligence: The Debate, TRIAL, May-June 1972 at 49; Woods, The Trial of a Personal Injury
Case In a Comparative Negligence Jurisdiction, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF ADVOCACY MANUAL, 392
(1975).
24. The plaintiff cannot recover if he is solely responsible for his injury. Hawley v.
Alaska S.S. Co., 236 F.2d 307, 311 (9th Cir. 1956).
25. Miss. Laws 1910, ch. 135 at 125 (now Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1956)).
26. P.R. Civil Code § 1802 (1930) (now P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968)).
1976]
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recently adopted the pure form of comparative negligence-Rhode
Island, 7 Washington,28 and California."
The modified form, or the Wisconsin rule,3" has been adopted
by the majority of states. In all modified comparative negligence
statutes, any plaintiff who is responsible for more than half of his
injuries or damages can recover nothing. Under this general princi-
ple, however, the various states have chosen different approaches
allowing recovery. One group of states, led originally by Wisconsin,"
provide that a negligent plaintiff can recover as long as his negli-
gence is less than that of the defendant. This means that the plain-
tiff's negligence must be 49 percent or less in order to recover. The
other approach, which is that currently taken by Wisconsin, pro-
vides that a plaintiff can recover if his negligence is not greater than
the negligence of the defendant. A simple example will illustrate the
difference between the two approaches.
In a jurisdiction with the 49 percent, or "less than", type of
statute, if a jury apportions the negligence equally between the
plaintiff and the defendant, as juries are likely to do, the plaintiff
would be allowed no recovery. In a jurisdiction following the "not
greater than" rule, a plaintiff found 50 percent negligent would be
entitled to recover 50 percent of his damages from a defendant who
was 50 percent negligent. In such jurisdiction, however, once the
jury determines that the plaintiff's negligence exceeds 50 percent,
e.g. 51 percent, the plaintiff recovers nothing. By way of contrast,
in a pure jurisdiction, the plaintiff who is 51 percent negligent could
recover 49 percent of his damages from a negligent defendant.
Even though the modified type of comparative negligence has
more advocates than the pure form, it has not gone without criti-
cism, most of which is directed toward the 49 percent rule. Before
Wisconsin amended its statute to conform to the 50 percent rule,
several courts of Wisconsin voiced dissatisfaction with the 49 per-
cent rule and urged the adoption of a pure form of comparative
negligence.2 The most valid criticism seems to lie in the inherent
illogic of allowing a plaintiff, 49 or 50 percent negligent, to recover
27. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1972).
28. REV. CODES WASH. ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1975).
29. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, supra note 1.
30. The modified rule is also consistently referred to by writers as the Wisconsin rule
because Wisconsin, in 1931, was the first jurisdiction to adopt this form of comparative
negligence. Wis. Laws 1931, ch. 242 (now Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966)).
31. In 1966, Wisconsin changed from this form of comparative negligence to the "greater
than" or 50% type. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 47 at 50 (now Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1973)).
32. Vincent v. Papst Brewing Co., 47 Wis.2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513, 513-17 (1970);
Spaeth v. Sereda, 41 Wis.2d 448, 164 N.W.2d 246, 248 (1969); Lawyer v. City of Park Falls,
35 Wis.2d 308, 151 N.W.2d 68, 72 (1967).
[Vol. 37
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49 or 50 percent of his damages, while denying a plaintiff 51 percent
negligent any recovery at all. The only answer to this criticism is the
argument that it is quite fair and logical to deny recovery to a
plaintiff who is more negligent than the defendant.
Any definitive evaluation of the benefits and detriments of the
different forms of comparative negligence can only be made after a
substantial body of law has developed around the recently enacted
statutes. Certainly either form of comparative negligence is prefera-
ble to the common law rule of contributory negligence.
III. THE MONTANA COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE
The Montana comparative negligence provision contains only
one section.3 The following brief analysis of that section is based on
the interpretations of identical statutes in other jurisdictions and on
a common sense reading of the statute. No Montana cases are yet
reported construing the statute, because it did not take effect until
July 1, 1975.31
The Montana statute allows the plaintiff to recover if his negli-
gence is not greater than the negligence of the defendant. 5 The
application of this provision can be predicated upon the interpreta-
tions of the New Hampshire and Wisconsin statutes. The New
Hampshire statute removes contributory negligence as a bar to re-
covery where "such negligence was not greater than the causal negli-
gence of the defendant. ' 36 Under this statute, it has been held that
the plaintiff may recover from the defendant if he is 50 percent at
fault, but not if he is 51 percent at fault.
37
In 1931 the Wisconsin legislature passed a law that allowed a
contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover "if such negligence was
not as great as the negligence of the defendant. 38 This was inter-
preted as a 49 percent statute.39 As a result of the criticism men-
tioned above, the Wisconsin legislature amended its statute by sub-
stituting the words greater than for as great as. 40 The revised stat-
ute, which is identical to the Montana and New Hampshire stat-
33. See R.C.M. 1947, § 58-607.1.
34. R.C.M. 1947, § 43-507, provides that the effective date of new statutes is July 1 of
the year in which enacted, unless the statute provides otherwise.
35. R.C.M. 1947, § 58-607.1.
36. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., § 507.7-a, as amended by L. 1970, ch. 35. The New Hamp-
shire statute reads exactly like Montana's except it specifically requires a general verdict.
37. Orcutt & Ross, Comparative Negligence in New Hampshire, 12 N.H.B.J. 6, 8
(1969).
38. Wis. Laws 1931, ch. 242 (now Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966)).
39. Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra note 32 at 516.
40. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1973) amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966).
1976]
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utes, has been interpreted as adopting a 50 percent rule.4' It logically
follows that Montana has also adopted the 50 percent rule of modi-
fied comparative negligence.
The following hypothetical situation illustrates how the Mon-
tana statute should be applied. Assume that the plaintiff has suf-
fered damages of $20,000 and the defense of contributory negligence
is raised. If the jury determines that the plaintiff and defendant are
each 50 percent negligent, the plaintiff recovers $10,000. If the plain-
tiff is 51 percent negligent and the defendant is 49 percent negligent,
the plaintiff recovers nothing. For a more typical example, assume
that the jury finds the plaintiff 25 percent negligent and the defen-
dant 75 percent negligent. The plaintiff is entitled to recover 75
percent of his damages or $15,000.
IV. EFFECT OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE ON EXISTING
TORT LAW
In its apparent haste to enact a comparative negligence statute,
the Montana legislature drafted a statute that establishes the gen-
eral principal of comparative negligence, but ignores other areas of
tort law that are inextricably interwoven with contributory negli-
gence. The statute is devoid of any provisions limiting the applica-
tion of doctrines that are part of the common law notion of contribu-
tory negligence or doctrines that are inconsistent with comparative
negligence.
When the first cases raising the issue of contributory negligence
are filed under the new statute, the Montana courts will have to
determine the impact of Montana's version of comparative negli-
gence on the other areas of tort law recognized in the state. The
following analysis will discuss the areas of tort law affected by the
enactment of a comparative negligence statute, describe the ap-
proaches taken in other states, and suggest alternatives for the Mon-
tana courts and legislature.
A. Assumption of Risk
Traditionally, the defense of assumption of risk has been a
complete defense similar to contributory negligence, and, where
found, a complete bar to recovery. The question that arises is how
assumption of risk should be regarded in a jurisdiction with a com-
parative negligence statute.
Some comparative negligence statutes deal specifically with
this question. The FELA abolishes the defense,4" as does the Con-
41. Lupie v. Hartzheim. 54 Wis.2d 415, 195 N.W.2d 461, 462 (1972).
42. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1970).
[Vol. 37
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necticut comparative negligence statute. 3 The statutes of Oregon44
and Utah45 merge assumption of risk into contributory negligence as
one of the elements of plaintiff's conduct which is to be compared
with the defendant's conduct. Montana's statute is silent regarding
assumption of risk, and either the courts or the legislature must
decide whether it will continue to be a complete defense or whether
it will be merged with the doctrine of comparative negligence.
There are basically three situations where the defense of as-
sumption of risk will arise. In the simplest form, the plaintiff, in
advance, gives his consent to relieve the defendant of a duty toward
him, and takes his chances of injury from a known risk, arising from
what the defendant is to do or leave undone." The second situation
is where the plaintiff voluntarily enters into a relationship with the
defendant, with the knowledge that the defendant will not protect
him against any risk. Again the defendant is relieved of the duty
which would otherwise exist.47 The plaintiff, in the third situation,
is aware of the risk already created by the defendant's negligence
and proceeds voluntarily to encounter it."
In these situations, if the plaintiff's conduct is reasonable and
knowingly engaged in, the defense of assumption of risk operates to
deny defendant's negligence by eliminating defendant's duty of due
care.49 If plaintiff's conduct in encountering a known risk is itself
unreasonable, as it could be in the second and third sisituations
where the danger is out of proportion to the advantage he seeks, his
conduct is a form of contributory negligence. In such cases the de-
fenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence overlap and
the defendant may plead either defense. 0 Such overlap indicates
the need to address this question directly under a comparative neg-
ligence rule. If the defendant can characterize conduct that is really
contributory negligence as assumption of risk, the purpose of the
comparative negligence statute could be easily subverted.
A recent Mississippi case illustrates the importance of such a
characterization of plaintiff's conduct in a comparative negligence
jurisdiction. Before June 29, 1973,1' Mississippi had traditionally
recognized assumption of risk as a complete and separate defense.
In a 1973 case, however, the Mississippi supreme court, recognizing
43. Conn. Pub. Acts No. 73-62, § 1(c) (now GEN. STAT. OF CONN. § 52-572(h) (1975)).
44. ORE. REV. STAT. § 18-470 (1971).
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1953).
46. Prosser, supra note 4 at 440.
47. Id. at 441.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 442.
50. Bugh v. Webb, 231 Ark. 27, 328 S.W.2d 379 (1959).
51. Brasswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So.2d 669 (Miss. 1973).
1976]
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the similarity of the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, held:
When appellant entered the lumber bin, it mattered not whether
he was encountering a known risk, or a risk that he should have
discovered because of his experience in the construction business,
the issue is whether he acted as a reasonably prudent man by
entering the lumber bin. In this case, the doctrine of assumption
of risk overlaps and coincides with contributory negligence. Since
assumption of risk is a bar to recovery, but contributory negligence
is not under our statute of comparative negligence, we see the
necessity of adopting a rule to govern cases where the two overlap
and coincide. We do not abolish the doctrine of assumption of risk,
but where assumption of risk overlaps and coincides with contribu-
tory negligence the rules of the defense of contributory negligence
shall apply.5"
At a minimum, Montana should provide that where these two
defenses overlap, the rules of contributory negligence will apply. An
even better approach is that taken by the Wisconsin 3 and Minne-
sota 4 courts, which merged the defense of assumption of risk into
contributory negligence and held that this result was more in har-
mony with the principle of comparative negligence than the former
rule. The Supreme Court of Washington declared in 1973 that when
that state's comparative negligence statute became effective on
April 1, 1974, a merger of assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence would occur and all previous distinctions would be abolished
in the comparison process. 5 This year the California supreme court
adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision" and in the
process declared that:
We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative
negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption
of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in propor-
tion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assump-
tion of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory
negligence.57
Such an approach is inherently more logical than the approach
of Arkansas, which recognizes assumption of risk as a complete
52. Id. at 672.
53. McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
The court held that assumption of risk was no longer a defense, but was evidence to be
considered by the jury in attributing degrees of negligence.
54. Springrose v. Wilmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
55. Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 82 Wash.2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973).
56. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, supra note 9 at 1239.
57. Id. at 1241.
[Vol. 37
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defense, separate and apart from contributory negligence.58 Under
this rule, when assumption of risk is raised as an issue, a jury must
determine that it does not apply before it can consider the compara-
tive negligence rule.59 Henry Woods, a tort litigation attorney of
prominence in Arkansas, suggests, however, that in view of the legis-
lature's recent modification of the comparative negligence statute,6 °
the court may interpret the amendment as intending that assump-
tion of risk should be compared as contributory negligence is com-
pared.6 '
There is sufficient precedent for either the courts" or the legis-
lature"3 to merge the doctrine of assumption of risk into the category
of contributory negligence for comparison purposes. Such action
would place the Montana Comparative Negligence statute more in
harmony with comparative negligence.
B. Last Clear Chance
That a majority of comparative negligence jurisdictions con-
tinue to recognize the last clear chance doctrine" indicates support
for the notion that last clear chance and comparative negligence are
not inherently inconsistent. It also probably indicates that compar-
ative negligence statutes or rules are generally advocated by the
plaintiff's bar and that a retention of the last clear chance doctrine
is clearly advantageous to the plaintiff. The courts have, neverthe-
less, justified this approach by holding that since the defendant has
the last opportunity to avoid the accident, his failure to do so is the
sole proximate cause of the injury. 5 Dean Prosser never found that
justification satisfactory in light of the development of the common
law doctrine of last clear chance. 6 He viewed the development of
last clear chance as a judicial attempt to ameliorate the harshness
of the application of contributory negligence and that the justifica-
58. Bugh v. Webb, supra note 50.
59. Woods, Trial of a Comparative Negligence Case, 21 AM. JUR. TRIULS 718, 739
[hereinafter referred to as Woods].
60. The 1973 amendments substituted the words "fault" and "fault chargeable to a
party claiming damages" for the words "negligence" and "contributory negligence." ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1 and 27-1730.2 (1962). A separate section of the new act defines
"fault" to include negligence, wilfull and wanton conduct, supplying of a defective product
in an unreasonable dangerous condition or any other act or omission or conduct actionable
in tort." ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 through 27-1765 (1962).
61. Woods, supra note 59 at 739.
62. See cases, supra notes 51, 53, 54, 55 and 56.
63. See statutes, supra notes 42, 43, 44 and 45.
64. Garrett, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 11 HOUSTON L. REV. 101, 114, citing W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 67 at 438 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Garrett].
65. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 66 at 427 (4th ed. 1971).
66. Id. at 427-28.
1976]
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tion in terms of proximate cause was an afterthought. 7 This theory
finds support in the better reasoned position that where compara-
tive negligence becomes the law, the need for the last clear chance
doctrine no longer exists, and the application of the doctrine should
be abandoned." This position has been adopted both legislatively
and judicially."
The Supreme Court of California in its decision adopting com-
parative negligence noted that the continued application of the doc-
trine of last clear chance would result in a windfall for the plaintiff,
in direct contravention of the principle of liability in proportion to
fault.70 The court held that last clear chance was to be subsumed
under the general process of assessing liability in proportion to
fault.7' In Cushman v. Perkins" the Maine supreme court held that
when contributory negligence was abolished as a complete defense,
last clear chance was as well.73
The most recent decision rendered under the FELA is suppor-
tive of the trend of abolishing last clear chance. In that case the
court held that the last clear chance doctrine was obsolete except
insofar as it defined one variety of negligence to be considered in the
apportionment of damages.74 An earlier FELA case had reached the
opposite result,75 and the United States Supreme Court has yet to
rule on the issue.
7 6
The current application of the doctrine of last clear chance in
Montana may have a substantial impact on the future of that doc-
trine under comparative negligence. The type of last clear chance
applied in Montana employs the concept of "discovered peril,"
which is also applied in Texas.77 Under the Montana application of
67. Id. at 428.
68. Comment, The Validity of Retaining the Last Clear Chance Doctrine in a State
Having a Comparative Negligence Statute, 1 GA. ST. B. J. 500, 501 (1965).
69. The original Arkansas "pure" comparative negligence statute specifically abolished
the last clear chance doctrine. Ark. Acts 1955, No. 191. The 1975 act which adopted the
modified form in Arkansas omitted any reference to the doctrine, but the Arkansas supreme
court Committee on Model Jury Instructions has taken the position that the doctrine has
been abolished, and has omitted an instruction on it. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1962);
ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 2D No. 617 (1974). The Colorado Committee has taken
a similar position in their jury instructions. COLO. REV. CODE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 9:18.
70. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, supra note 1 at 1240.
71. Id. at 1242.
72. Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968).
73. Id. at 850.
74. Seaboard Coast Line v. Dougherty, 118 Ga. App. 518, 164 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1968),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 939 (1970).
75. Moran v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 330 Mo. 278, 48 S.W.2d 881, 883-84 (1932)
cert. denied 287 U.S. 621 (1963).
76. See St. Louis, S.W. Ry. v. Simpson, 286 U.S. 346, 350 (1932).
77. Sisti v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 189, 229 S.W.2d 610, 613-14 (1950).
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this doctrine, for the defendant to be liable to a negligent, inatten-
tive plaintiff, the injury must have been caused by the negligence
of the plaintiff; actual discovery of the perilous situation of the
person or property must have been made by the defendant in time
to avert injury; and the defendant must have thereafter failed to use
ordinary care to avert the injury.7" As a recent law review article
noted,79 the application of discovered peril, instead of the traditional
last clear chance doctrine, might provide a rationale for retaining
last clear chance in a jurisdiction that has adopted comparative
negligence. Because the defendant, under the discovered peril doc-
trine, must have actual knowledge of the plaintiff's danger and fail
to prevent the accident, the defendant's conduct could be character-
ized as willful or wanton."0 Since willful and wanton conduct ex-
tends beyond simple negligence, an argument can be made that
such conduct should not be affected by comparative negligence.8'
Another rationale for the continued recognition of the doctrine
of last clear chance in Montana under the new comparative negli-
gence statute is based on the position taken by the Montana su-
preme court in cases brought under the FELA. In a 1916 case8" the
court ruled that a complaint, proceeding upon the theory of last
clear chance, was proper under FELA, notwithstanding its compar-
ative negligence provision." The rationale of the court in applying
the last clear chance doctrine was clearly enunciated by the court
in a subsequent case. 4 Referring to its earlier opinion, the court
explained:
[U]nder the act (FELA) the contributory negligence of the in-
jured employee did not defeat his recovery but might diminish the
amount of damages, and it was only for the purpose of avoiding the
latter contingency that the doctrine of last clear chance was in-
jected into the case."
These Montana supreme court decisions construing the FELA
do not obviate the need for a fresh new consideration by the court
of the applicability of last clear chance under the new comparative
negligence statute. Vigorous defense lawyers will advocate the re-
tention of the doctrine of assumption of risk so that the negligent
defendant will be absolved of any liability to the plaintiff, while the
78. Feeley v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 230 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1956).
79. Garrett, supra note 64.
80. Woldeck v. Watts, 326 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
81. Sugarland Indus. v. Daily, 135 Tex. 532, 143 S.W.2d 931, 933 (1940).
82. Doichinoff v. Chicago N. & St. P. Ry. Co., 51 Mont. 582, 154 P. 924 (1916).
83. Id. at 586.
84. Stricklin v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 59 Mont. 367, 197 P. 839 (1921).
85. Id. at 372.
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ardent plaintiff's attorney will insist on the retention of the doctrine
of last clear chance so that the negligent defendant will be responsi-
ble for 100 percent of the damages of the plaintiff, in spite of plain-
tiff's initial negligence. Granting a plaintiff full recovery for defen-
dant's failure to utilize his "last clear chance," despite the plain-
tiff's negligence in the first place, is not in keeping with the spirit
of the comparative negligence concept of allocating damages in pro-
portion to fault.8"
C. Multiple Parties
1. Comparison of Negligence
When a plaintiff is injured by the concurring negligence of two
or more defendants, the threshold question that will arise under the
new comparative negligence statute will be whether the plaintiff's
negligence is to be compared against the negligence of each defen-
dant or against the combined negligence of all defendants. 7
The legislature could have resolved this question statutorily as
have the legislatures of Connecticut," Nevada,8" and Texas; ° and it
may do so in a subsequent session. But before the legislature will
have an opportunity to consider such an addition to the statute, the
courts will undoubtedly be confronted with the question.
To illustrate the problem the courts will face, assume that the
plaintiff is 40 percent negligent and that defendant one and defen-
dant two are each 30 percent negligent. Does the plaintiff recover
any of his damages? The two pioneering jurisdictions in the field of
comparative negligence reached diametrically opposed conclusions.
In Wisconsin the plaintiff would recover nothing." In Arkansas, the
plaintiff would receive 60 percent of his damages."2
The Wisconsin court held that the plaintiff's negligence must
be compared with that of each defendant and that the plaintiff
cannot recover from any defendant whose negligence is equal to or
less than that of the plaintiff. 3 The Arkansas court determined that
the negligence of all defendants should be combined and compared
to that of the plaintiff. 4 If the combined negligence of all the defen-
86. Maclntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1252 (1940).
87. This problem occurs only in "modified comparative negligence" states, since in
"pure" comparative negligence states the plaintiff recovers regardless of the percentage of
fault attributable to him.
88. GEN. STAT. OF CONN. § 52-572(h) (1975).
89. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1973).
90. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a), § 1 (Supp. 1975).
91. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
92. Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 346 S.W.2d 20, 26 (1962).
93. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., supra note 91 at 727.
94. Walton v. Tull, supra note 92 at 26.
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dants exceeds that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff can recover from any
of them, even from a defendant whose individual negligence is sub-
stantially less than that of the plaintiff."
In recognizing the illogic and inequity of the rule advocated by
Wisconsin, the Arkansas court noted that it was impossible to ex-
plain why a plaintiff responsible for one-third of the negligence
could recover two-thirds of the damages in a two party case, but
could not recover anything if two thirds of the negligence were
spread evenly among several defendants." Such a rule would dis-
courage the plaintiff from joining all possible defendants, since a
large number of defendants would be likely to spread the responsi-
bility so thin that the plaintiff's negligence would exceed that of
each defendant. Conversely, it would be to the advantage of the
defendant to search for any and all possible joint tortfeasors.
The approach taken by the Arkansas court was recently codi-
fied by the Texas legislature in their new comparative negligence
bill. 7 Section 2(b) of that act provides that in multiple defendant
cases, the plaintiff's negligence will be compared to the negligence
of the defendants taken as a unit to determine if the negligence of
the plaintiff has reached a level that bars recovery.98 Since the modi-
fied comparative negligence section of the Texas statute is identical
to that adopted by Montana, the experience under the Texas stat-
ute serves as a useful example of what can and should be done under
the Montana statute.
Assume that the plaintiff's damages in a case are $20,000 and
the plaintiff's negligence has been adjudged to be 40 percent. Defen-
dants One, Two, and Three are each 20 percent negligent. The
negligence of the plaintiff clearly exceeds the negligence of each
defendant viewed individually, but the total negligence of the defen-
dants is greater than the negligence of the plaintiff. Under the Texas
statutory rule or the Arkansas court-imposed rule, the plaintiff
would recover $12,000 or 60 percent of his damages; in Wisconsin
he would recover nothing.
2. Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
The second problem arising in cases involving multiple defen-
dants is the distribution of damages among the several responsible
defendants. The new Montana statute does not speak to this issue
and the courts will again be required to formulate appropriate rules.
95. Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 488 S.W.2d 34 (1972).
96. Walton v. Tull, supra note 92 at 26-27.
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This brief discussion of this very complicated area of tort law
will serve to illustrate various results that can occur under the dif-
ferent statutory and judicial constructions of the concepts of contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors and of joint and several liability. It
will also offer some precedent that might be helpful to the courts
and practicing attorneys in determining what Montana's law ought
to be.
Montana courts have followed the traditional common law rule
that there is no contribution among joint tortfeasors in the absence
of legislative enactment.9 And Montana has not adopted the Uni-
form Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act or any other contri-
bution act that would resolve the inequity that results when contri-
bution is not allowed. While only nine jurisdictions have adopted
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,' 0 and only nine
jurisdictions have allowed contribution in the absence of legisla-
tion,'0 1 a majority of the American states now permit contribution
among tortfeasors.° 2 Because the notion behind contribution among
joint tortfeasors, namely the allocation of damages based on propor-
tion of fault, is central to the purpose of comparative negligence,
most of the states' recently adopting comparative negligence have
specifically provided in their statutes for contribution among tort-
feasors.
The most popular form of contribution is that adopted by Ar-
kansas, 104 which provides for a pro rata contribution according to
fault. '° Arkansas adopted this provision shortly before it adopted its
comparative negligence statute and consequently there is no history
in that state of the operation of comparative negligence without
contribution among tortfeasors. Wisconsin, the other pioneer in
comparative negligence, reached the same result judicially, and the
99. Panasuk v. Seaton, 277 F. Supp. 979 (D. Mont. 1968); Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
United States, 187 F. Supp. 690, 693 (D. Mont. 1960).
100. Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and South Dakota.
101. Knell v. Feltman, 85 App. D.C. 22, 174 F.2d 662 (1949); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa
800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Bedell v.
Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320
(1887); Wiener v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Goldman v. Mitchell-
Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928) (Pennsylvania subsequently adopted a statute);
Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950); and Ellis v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918) (Wisconsin subsequently adopted a stat-
ute).
102. See jurisdictions cited supra note 100, 101 and infra note 103.
103. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-803(1) (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01, subd. 1
(Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:15-53 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(b) (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 98-27-39 (1953).
104. Woods, supra note 59 at 741.
105. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 2(a) (1955).
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court further declared that the right of one tortfeasor to contribution
is not barred because his negligence may be equal to, or greater
than, the negligence of his joint tortfeasor. °6
As Dean Prosser points out in his treatise on tort law, there is
an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the
entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants are responsible, to
be shouldered by one alone, while the other goes scot free. ' "7
Whether the decision on contribution is made by the courts or by
the legislature, the guiding principle in their deliberations should be
the injustice of the present system and the far-sighted approaches
recently taken by other states.
Because the Texas approach of spreading liability among all
negligent defendants is both equitable and logical, it will be dis-
cussed and compared with the other approaches and will be offered
as a responsible solution for Montana.
The Texas statute enacting comparative negligence specifically
addresses itself to the issue of contribution among tortfeasors and
joint and several liability. It provides that:
[I]n multiple defendant cases in which the plaintiffs negligence
does not exceed the total negligence of all defendants, contribution
to the plaintiff will be in proportion to the percentage of negligence
attributed to each defendant.'"'
Section 2(c) of that statute states that each defendant is jointly and
severally liable for the entire judgment awarded, but contains the
exception that a defendant less negligent than the plaintiff is liable
only in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributed to that
defendant. 0 For example, the plaintiff's damages are $10,000. The
plaintiff is determined to be 40 percent negligent and defendants
One, Two, and Three are 10, 20 and 30 percent negligent. Since the
combined negligence of the defendants is 60 percent, the plaintiff
is entitled to recover $6,000 under comparative negligence. Defen-
dant One is liable for $1,000, defendant Two is liable for $2,000 and
defendant Three is liable for $3,000. None of the defendants are
jointly and severlly liable for the negligence of the other since the
negligence of each is less than that of the plaintiff. In all multiple
defendant suits where plaintiff's negligence is less than each defen-
dant's negligence, the defendants are jointly and severally liable to
the plaintiff for all recoverable damages.
The significance of the Texas approach can be seen by compar-
106. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
107. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 50 at 307 (4th ed. 1971).
108. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(b) (Supp. 1975).
109. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Supp. 1975).
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ing the results achieved under it with the results obtained in juris-
dictions following a traditional contribution principle. Assume that
plaintiff's damages are $10,000 and that he is 20 percent negligent.
Defendants One, Two and Three are 10 percent, 30 percent and 40
percent negligent-a total of 80 percent negligent. The plaintiff is
entitled to recover $8,000. Under the New Hampshire approach to
contribution the plaintiff could recover nothing from defendant
One, since his negligence is less than the plaintiff's."" Logically it
would appear that defendant Two is responsible for $3,000 and de-
fendant Three for $4,000. That amount, however, would only equal
$7,000 of the $8,000 that the plaintiff is entitled to receive. Conse-
quently, these two defendants must make up the remaining $1,000
in proportion to the amount of their own negligence. The result is
that the plaintiff recovers his full measure of damages, two defen-
dants pay more than they were responsible for and defendant One
gets by with paying nothing, although he is 10 percent negligent.
Under the Texas approach defendant One would be liable for the
$1,000 of damages he caused, but he would not be jointly and sever-
ally liable since his negligence is less than that of plaintiff.
Wisconsin achieved a contribution rule similar to that of New
Hampshire by judicial decision. In the landmark case of Bielski v.
Schulze, ' the Wisconsin supreme court held that multiple defen-
dants are liable only for an amount proportionate to their individual
degrees of negligence. In that case there were two defendants-one
was 95 percent negligent and the other was 5 percent negligent. The
95 percent negligent defendant sought a 50 percent contribution of
damages from the other defendant. The Court held that contribu-
tion was to be determined by degree of negligence, so that the defen-
dant who was 95 percent negligent paid 95 percent of the damages. " 2
A subsequent Wisconsin case specifically held that joint and several
liability still applied to negligence actions."3 In that case the plain-
tiff was 5 percent negligent, defendant One was 75 percent negligent
and defendant Two was 20 percent negligent. Defendant One was
judgment proof, so defendant Two had to pay the plaintiff's 95
percent judgment."' The same result would be achieved under the
Texas statute, because defendant Two was more negligent than the
plaintiff and therefore, jointly and severally liable. The exception
from joint and several liability applies only to a defendant whose
110. Orcutt & Ross, supra note 37 at 9. This article notes that New Hampshire has
abolished joint and several liability.
111. Bielski v. Schulze, supra note 106.
112. Id.
113. Chille v. Howard, 34 Wis.2d 491, 149 N.W.2d 600, 605 (1967).
114. Id. at 604-605.
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negligence is less than that of the plaintiff.
Any statutory treatment of the problem of contribution must
deal with a great many more issues than can be discussed here, such
as the effect of settlement on contribution, the effect of a release,
and when contribution claims are to be determined. The Texas
statute specifically answers these questions"' and any person in-
tending to legislate on this subject would do well to look at the
statute.
One good solution to the potential problems of comparative
negligence in Montana would be for the legislature to enact a statute
that would compare the plaintiff's negligence with the combined
negligence of all defendants. The statute should also allow contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors, based on the proportion of negligence
and modify the doctrine of joint and several liability to the extent
that a defendant less negligent than the plaintiff should not have
to shoulder the entire burden of all defendants' negligence. How-
ever, such legislation cannot come soon enough for courts that will
be faced with cases before the next legislature meets. It is urged that
such courts follow the Arkansas precedent of comparing the plain-
tiff's negligence with the combined negligence of all defendants,"6
and the Wisconsin court's rule that allows for a pro rata contribu-
tion among defendants based on fault."7
D. Proximate Cause
The adoption of comparative negligence should have no effect
on the rule of proximate cause-proximate cause being defined as
that which, in "a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.""18 In practice, however,
there may be some effect. Contributory negligence has been ex-
plained by a majority of courts in the United States in terms of
"proximate cause", saying that the plaintiff's negligence is an inter-
vening, or insulating cause between the defendant's negligence and
the result." 9 Since the comparative negligence statute does not
eliminate contributory negligence as a defense but merely abrogates
the common law rule that contributory negligence is no longer an
inexorable bar to recovery, the same causal connection must be
shown. In other words, where fault can be apportioned, courts will
115. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d) (Supp. 1975).
116. Walton v. Tull, supra note 92.
117. Bielski v. Schulze, supra note 106.
118. Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909);
Sztaba v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 147 Mont. 185, 411 P.2d 379 (1966).
119. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRrs, § 65 at 417 (4th ed. 1971).
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not be quick to find a remote, intervening cause of the plaintiff's
damages.120
Where the negligence on the part of a plaintiff will not defeat
that plaintiff's recovery, there will be an increased emphasis on the
proof of proximate cause, since a finding that the plaintiff's negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause or a finding that defendant's
negligence was not the proximate cause of injury will be an exculpa-
tory defense even in "pure" comparative negligence jurisdictions.'2 '
While both juries'22 and the courts'2 3 in Mississippi have been influ-
enced by the "sole proximate cause" argument, Arkansas'24 and
Wisconsin' 5 juries and courts have been reluctant to find a sole
proximate cause that would defeat plaintiff's recovery.
Whether comparative negligence has any effect on the applica-
tion of proximate cause in Montana may very largely depend on how
the case is submitted to the jury. In Wisconsin, where interrogato-
ries are extensively used, it is the practice to submit separate inter-
rogatories on negligence and proximate cause.' 6 The result is often
a finding of negligence but not of proximate cause, resulting in a
mandatory verdict for the defendant.'27 The Arkansas system of
including negligence and proximate cause in one interrogatory is
probably preferable for the plaintiff,' 8 since the jury under the Wis-
consin system may not fully understand the definition and import-
ance of proximate cause, and may exculpate the defendant without
intending to do so.
E. Trial of a Comparative Negligence Case
1. Pleading
Contributory negligence is still an affirmative defense and must
be pleaded in a comparative negligence jurisdiction as in other juris-
dictions. It is apparently a common practice in jurisdictions with
modified comparative negligence statutes to allege affirmatively
that the plaintiff's negligence has exceeded that of the defendant
and that the plaintiff is therefore entitled to no recovery under the
complaint. Such language is unnecessary since the mere assertion
120. Woods, supra note 59 at 728.
121. See, e.g., Mississippi Export Ry. Co. v. Summers, 194 Miss. 179, 11 So.2d 429
(1943), sugg. of error overr. 194 Miss. 193, 11 So.2d 905 (1943).
122. See, Bates v. Walker, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So.2d 611 (1958).
123. Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Smith, 243 Miss. 766, 140 So.2d 856 (1962).
124. Rhodes v. Service Machine Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
125. Presser v. Siesel Constr. Co., 19 Wis.2d 54, 119 N.W.2d 405 (1963).
126. Woods, supra note 59 at 731.
127. Wills v. Regan, 58 Wis.2d 328, 206 N.W.2d 398 (1973).
128. Woods, supra note 59 at 731.
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of contributory negligence brings the comparative negligence princi-
ple into play.-'I
2. Voir Dire and Opening Statement
The trial techniques used in a comparative negligence jurisdic-
tion do not differ appreciably from techniques used in any other tort
litigation. Perhaps the crucial decision that the plaintiff's attorney
must face is whether to concede that this client was negligent to
some degree or whether to argue that all of the negligence should
be charged to the defendant. The general consensus appears to be
that if proof is likely to establish negligence on the plaintiff's part,
it is better to condede such negligence at the earliest opportunity
and concentrate on establishing that it was less than that of the
defendants or not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
3. Instructions, Interrogatories, and General or Special Verdicts
The most important change in trial practice with comparative
negligence is how the case is submitted to the jury. Since a thorough
discussion of instructions, interrogatories, and verdicts is not possi-
ble here, this discussion will address only the most salient points
and offer some observations as to what procedure should be used in
Montana to derive the best and most consistent advantage from the
new comparative negligence statute.
Montana's Rule 49(a) and (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that at the judge's discretion, cases may be submitted on
either the general or special verdict. 3 ' At the outset, it might be
noted that, as a tactical matter, general verdicts are more favorable
to plaintiffs and special verdicts are more favorable to the defen-
dants. It is hoped, however, that the relative advantages to either
side will be subordinate to considerations of which method seems
more consistent with the goals of comparative negligence.
Here again the two pioneers in the field of comparative negli-
gence have taken contrary positions. In Arkansas, where discretion
rests with the trial judge as it does in Montana, the general verdict
is favored.' 3' Dean Prosser suggests that such retention has nothing
to do with the advantages of the general verdict but is, by and large,
the result of a bar and court system's traditional inertia toward
innovation in procedure. 32 Another possible reason for the failure of
many jurisdictions to use special verdicts with their comparative
129. Id.
130. MONTANA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 49(a) and 49(b).
131. Woods, supra note 59 at 750.
132. Prosser, supra note 4 at 491.
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negligence statutes, or to incorporate the special verdict into the
statute, lies in the fact that plaintiff's attorneys generally sponsor
the comparative negligence legislation. In Wisconsin, where the
court must, when requested by either party, direct the jury to find
a special verdict,13 special verdicts are used universally and are
considered to be a crucial substantive part of the system of compar-
ative negligence. 34 Even though the use of a special verdict may be
somewhat disadvantageous to the plaintiff, there is much to com-
mend its use.'
31
In a case requiring apportionment of damages under the Wis-
consin procedure, the jury is not asked to return a general verdict
for the plaintiff with an assessment of the recoverable damages, but
rather, it is asked a series of specific questions. 3 These basic, ele-
mental questions are essential to a clear understanding of the issues
confronting the jury and should be used as special interrogatories
accompanying the general verdict, if a special verdict is not used.
The question so submitted should be simply and concisely worded
and should include the elements contained in the sample questions
below:
1. At the time of the accident, was defendant X negligent in
the operation of his automobile? A. Yes.
2. Was defendant X's negligence a cause of the accident? A.
Yes.
3. At the time of the accident was plaintiff Y negligent in the
operation of her bicycle? A. Yes.
4. Was plaintiff's negligence a cause of the accident? A. Yes.
5. If you answer all of questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 "Yes", then
answer this question: What percentage of the total negligence is
attributable to the defendant X? A. 75 percent. What percentage
of the total negligence is attributable to plaintiff Y? A. 25 percent.
6. What is the amount of damages that Plaintiff Y has sus-
tained? A. $20,000.
Once the jury has answered these questions, the court can apportion
133. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.27 (1967).
134. Millsap v. Cent. Wis. Motor Trans. Co., 41 Ill. App.2d 1, 189 N.E.2d 793 (1963).
135. Not only are special verdicts, or special interrogatories submitted with general
verdicts, more likely to arrive at substantial justice, but they also provide a way in which to
ameliorate the problem of an unreliable and irresponsible jury. Prosser, supra note 4 at 497.
When a case is submitted on a special verdict or a general verdict with special interrogatories,
the need for long complicated instructions on the law is avoided. A special verdict requires
answers to specific questions only on issues, without any general verdict for plaintiff or
defendant. Special interrogatories are asked, in addition to the instructions to return a gen-
eral verdict, as a check on the jury's conclusion. General instructions are usually not given
where special verdicts are used, and instructions on special issues are limited to those neces-
sary and appropriate to enable the jury to understand.
136. Prosser, supra note 4 at 498.
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the damages and enter judgment for plaintiff Y for 75 percent of her
damages or $15,000. The jury is not told the effect of its answers,
and indeed it has been held to be error for counsel to so advise them
or read the apportionment statute to them. 7
The Montana bar can look for guidance to the voluminous his-
tory in Wisconsin on the use of the special verdict in comparative
negligence cases. 31 Valuable information can also be obtained from
North Carolina and Texas where the special issue has become stan-
dard procedure. 13 An Illinois case construing the Wisconsin law
illustrates the importance of the special verdict in conjunction with
the comparative negligence statute. In Milisap v. Central Wisconsin
Motor Transport Company, 10 the Illinois supreme court found it to
be reversible error to use a general verdict in a comparative negli-
gence case. The court reasoned as follows:
[Tihe proper use of the Wisconsin interrogatory process is so inti-
mately tied to the correct application of the comparative negli-
gence doctrine as to constitute an integral part of the substance of
that doctrine. To hold otherwise and permit a reading of the Wis-
consin statute to the jury, accompanied by imprecise instructions,
would have the practical effect of emasculating the Wisconsin stat-
ute which we seek to apply."1
It is hoped that there will be general support in Montana for
the use of special verdicts in comparative negligence cases. There
are at least three methods of insuring such use. One is the approach
taken by Kansas in which the comparative negligence statute re-
quires that findings of the jury be determined by special verdict.14 1
This approach requires legislative enactment. The second approach,
also requiring legislative enactment, is to amend Rule 49 of the
present Montana Rules of Civil Procedure to require the court to
137. De Groot v. Akkeron, 225 Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937).
138. See, e.g., Schulz v. General Gas Co., 233 Wis. 118, 288 N.W. 803 (1939); Tomany
v. Camozzi, 238 Wis. 611, 300 N.W. 508 (1941); Horn v. Snow White Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Co., 240 Wis. 312, 3 N.W. 2d 380 (1942); Werner Transp. Co. v. Barts, 57 Wis.2d 714, 205
N.W.2d 394 (1973).
139. Prosser, supra note 4 at 500, n. 203 states that:
The Texas procedure still has the reputation of creating confusion because of the
tendency of Texas attorneys to put complicated questions on over-refined neceties.
See Dooley, "The Use of Special Issues Under the State and Federal Rules," 20 TEx.
L. REVIEW 32 (1941); McCormick, "Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil
Cases," 2 F.R.D. 176, 180 (1943). McCormick says that in North Carolina "simplic-
ity and directness in the submission by questions to the jury is the key to the success
of the method," and that in Wisconsin the questions although more numerous than
in North Carolina, "are apparently held within reason." Id. at 179.
140. Millsap v. Cent. Wis. Motor Transp. Co., supra note 134.
141. Millsap v. Cent. Wis. Motor Trans. Co., supra note 134 at 802. Aff'd in Johnson
v. Ward, 6 Ill. App.3d 1615, 286 N.E.2d 637 (1972).
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a)(b)(Supp. 1975).
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direct a special verdict on the request of either party to the law-
suit.' The third method of achieving the widespread use of the
special verdict in Montana is for the courts to adopt the position of
the courts in Wisconsin and Illinois that the use of the special ver-
dict is essential to the purpose of the comparative negligence stat-
ute. "' Short of these approaches, it can be hoped that Montana
judges will follow the suggestion of Judge Frank and require special
verdicts or written interrogatories, on their own motion or when
requested to do so. ' Judge Frank's opinion in Skidmore v. Balti-
more & Ohio R.R. Co., 4 is a persuasive and forceful account of the
failure of the general verdict and an impassioned plea for the use of
special verdicts in order to ensure the rendition of substantial jus-
tice for all persons.
Dean Prosser reports that, in spite of the reputed advantages
to the plaintiff of the general verdict, plaintiff and defense attorneys
alike in Wisconsin find the use of the special verdict indispensible
to the successful operation of comparative negligence.'47 Apparently,
the increase in the number of recoveries that results from the abro-
gation of the complete defense of contributory negligence has been
balanced by a reduction in the size of verdicts, as juries apportion
the damages instead of refusing to find contributory negligence.'48
V. CONCLUSION
The Montana comparative negligence statute is a welcome
product of the 1975 legislature. It is hoped that the next session of
the legislature will specifically address itself to some of the issues
raised in this comment and enact companion legislation to more
fully implement the concept of comparative negligence in Montana.
143. This is the procedure required in Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1953).
144. See cases, supra notes 134 and 140.
145. Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948).
146. Id.
147. Prosser, supra note 4 at 502.
148. Id. at 502.
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